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Tacit knowledge is the knowledge that we draw upon in use, but is difficult to have 
consciousness of, or to express in language. The proliferation in the use of tacit knowledge in 
management research has generated a diversity of understandings that has reduced the clarity 
of the concept. In this review, our main goal is to contribute to an integrative theorizing of tacit 
knowledge. In particular, we aim to grasp the different understandings of tacit knowledge, trace 
them to the onto-epistemological assumptions researchers make concerning the nature of 
knowledge and action, and suggest a framework that enables researchers to get a coherent 
understanding of the diverse literature. We identify three perspectives on tacit knowledge: the 
Conversion, Interactional, and Practice perspectives. We describe each perspective, trace its 
development to particular ontological and epistemological commitments, and discuss 
commonalities and differences. Furthermore, we reflect on methodological issues and suggest 
possibilities for further research, including the relationship between artificial intelligence and 






Tacit knowledge (hereafter TK) is the knowledge that we draw upon in action (e.g. driving,  
teaching, operating a machine, etc.), but is difficult to have consciousness of, or express in 
language (Polanyi, 1958, 1966b). Management researchers have assumed TK is linked to 
several organizational-related issues, ranging from strategy and organizational learning, to 
innovation and performance (Bloodgood, Morrow, & Morrow Jr, 2003; Clarysse, Wright, & 
Van de Velde, 2011; Yang, Zheng, & Zaheer, 2015). As is evident by the number of studies 
investigating TK, its popularity over the last thirty years has increased significantly. However, 
the proliferation of relevant research has yielded diverse and sometimes conflicting 
understandings of TK, calling for construct clarity and conceptual integration. For example, 
while some scholars maintain that “tacit knowledge can be best described as knowledge that 
has not yet been abstracted from practice” (Feller, Parhankangas, Smeds, & Jaatinen, 2013, p. 
316), others maintain the opposite: TK cannot be abstracted as it is an inherent feature of all 
knowledge (Tsoukas, 2011). In addition, while some scholars argue that TK is held by 
individuals (Athanassiou & Douglas, 1999, p. 84), others argue that TK is held by groups 
(Brown & Duguid, 2001). Such a diversity of understandings has led some scholars to despair 
that there is “nothing inherently positive about knowledge talk (except for academics having 
stakes in it)” (see Alvesson & Kärreman, 2001, p. 1014).  
Moreover, recent advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have enabled machines to execute a 
range of complex tasks for which TK was originally thought to be essential (Aplaydin, 2016). 
One has only to think of the development of self-driving cars, robots, and smart information 
systems such as AlphaGo1 to realize that these machines and systems appear to have an ability 
to learn and adapt (Silver et al., 2016). Since through machine learning (Alpaydin, 2016), 
                                                 




computer systems have the ability to learn (i.e. to improve performance in the execution of a 
task through identifying patterns in sample inputs), the question concerning if and how TK is 
implicated in artifacts’ intelligent functioning invites fresh thinking (von Krogh, 2018). In 
addition, new advances in phenomenologically oriented cognitive science and in organization 
theory, have problematized intellectualist understandings of TK (i.e. understandings that 
highlight the primacy of cognition), suggesting a line of research that is process-cum-practice 
oriented (i.e. views organizational phenomena as ongoing activities unfolding within 
normatively structured settings) (Gehman, Trevino, & Garud, 2013; Langley & Tsoukas, 2017; 
Tsoukas, 2019), and a style of theorizing that is integrative (i.e. seeks to overcome dualisms 
such as mind and body, cognition and affect) (Radman, 2012; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; 
Tsoukas, 2017). 
Undoubtedly, the increasing emphasis on the importance of TK has enriched management 
theorizing. However, without developing a coherent understanding of the different uses of TK 
in management research, limited progress can be hoped to be achieved. The reason is that 
“construct clarity” (Suddaby, 2010) is reduced when a construct becomes an “umbrella 
construct” (Kudesia, in press, p. 6), as TK has become. To enhance construct clarity, therefore, 
more refined conceptual distinctions need to be drawn. This requires mapping out 
systematically the different uses to which a construct is put, which is what we will do here (see 
Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2015 for a similar point with regard to “sensemaking”).  
Our overall goal in this review is to contribute to the integrative theorizing of tacit knowledge 
in management research. To achieve this, we aim at the following. Firstly, to offer a 
theoretically insightful, state-of-the-art synopsis of the diversity of research related to how TK 
has been used in the field. Secondly, to address the conceptual confusion that is generated by 
the profligate use of tacit knowledge in management research. Thirdly, to discuss the 




identify areas of research currently under-developed and/or perspectives under-utilized, which 
offer new lines of research. Overall, we hold that the clarification of the strengths and 
limitations of each perspective will assist researchers to coherently understand differences, 
seek complementarities, and, thus, engage in more integrative theorizing (M. Thompson, 2011, 
p. 757; Tsoukas, 2017).  
Although other researchers have usefully sought to review studies of TK, the frameworks they 
suggest have certain limitations, related to their narrow scope and/or thin analytical categories. 
Specifically, four reviews are limited in scope, focusing on very specific aspects of TK (e.g. at 
the individual level) or on the relationship between TK and a particular construct (e.g. 
innovation) (Gourlay, 2006b; Leonard & Sensiper, 2011; M. Li & Gao, 2003; Tamer Cavusgil, 
Calantone, & Zhao, 2003). Other studies that have had a broader scope are limited analytically 
due to the conceptually thin categories chosen for organizing the review. For example, 
Venkitachalam and Busch’s (2012) review is organized around findings within management 
subfields, rather than identifying schools of thought, which could shed light on the diverse uses 
of TK as a concept. In contrast, Castillo’s (2002) review, while identifying schools of thought, 
it does so by creating a typology that uses overlapping (and at times esoteric) categories (e.g. 
“nonepistle tacit knowledge”, “sagacious tacit knowledge”), leaves out the body, and takes no 
account of important developments in AI. Finally, one meta-analysis refers to TK but is not 
focused solely on the construct, but on the features of the learning organization at large, and its 
sampling population consists of only 20 studies (Thomas & Allen, 2006, p. 129).  
In this review, we seek to overcome the preceding limitations of hitherto reviews by increasing 
the scope of our review and organizing it in terms of comprehensive analytical categories. 
Specifically, in terms of scope, we extend the range of our review by (a) including studies at 
both the individual and collective levels of analysis (cf. Gourlay, 2006b), and (b) focusing on 




strategy, knowledge sharing) (cf. Leonard & Sensiper, 2011; M. Li & Gao, 2003; Tamer 
Cavusgil et al., 2003).  
In terms of analytical categories, we search for the underlying ontological-epistemological 
(hereafter: onto-epistemological) assumptions of the reviewed studies in order to identify 
distinct perspectives on TK (cf. Castillo, 2002; Venkitachalam & Busch, 2012). The reason for 
doing this is that onto-epistemological assumptions provide researchers with “a system of 
picturing” (Harré, 1985, p. 16; Tsoukas, 2019, p. 3; Tsoukas & Chia, 2011, p. 3) that structures 
how researchers conceptualize and empirically explore TK (Burrell & Morgan, 2016; Tsoukas, 
2005, pt. III, 2019; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). We distinguish two onto-epistemological 
platforms: intellectualist and phenomenological. An intellectualist onto-epistemology assumes 
that TK and other types of knowledge are discrete entities that have inherent and relatively 
stable characteristics (Dreyfus, 2014). A phenomenological onto-epistemology assumes that 
TK and other types of knowledge are intertwined, inscribed in bodily skills, and embedded in 
sociomaterial practices (Dreyfus, 2014, 2017; Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011). The intellectualist 
onto-epistemology privileges the detached observer’s perspective, while the phenomenological 
gives priority to the embodied actor’s experience (Tsoukas & Chia, 2011). 
Following an extensive review of the relevant literature (more about this shortly), we identify 
three perspectives in the literature: the Conversion, the Interactional and the Practice 
perspectives. Briefly, Conversion scholars argue that there are two distinct types of knowledge 
(tacit and explicit), each convertible to the other in the carrying out of action. Interactional 
scholars also identify tacit and explicit knowledge as two distinct types, arguing that they must 
be joined together by individuals for action to be performed. The Conversion and Interactional 
perspectives adopt an intellectualist onto-epistemology. Finally, the Practice perspective 




cannot be disentangled (not mutually converted, nor simply joined) when action is performed. 
The Practice perspective adopts a phenomenological onto-epistemology. 
For our review, we carried out a database search in the ISI Web of Knowledge to identify 
studies that had the keywords “tacit knowledge” and its synonyms (i.e. “know-how”, 
“procedural knowledge”, “implicit knowledge”) in 17 leading journals (Academy of 
Management Review, Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Learning 
and Education, British Journal of Management, Human Relations, Journal of Applied 
Psychology, Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies, Journal of 
Organizational Behavior, Management Learning, Management Science, MIS Quarterly, 
Organization, Organization Science, Organization Studies, Personnel Psychology and 
Strategic Management Journal). Three reasons underlie the selection of the journals chosen: 
(i) they are held in high esteem in relevant journal rankings (Laing, Sporn, Galliers, & Roe, 
2015); (ii) they represent both U.S. and European journals, and (iii) they feature a diverse range 
of research approaches. The database search returned 251 articles. After reading each paper, 
we decided to exclude 80 studies from our review, thus leaving 171 articles. The reason for 
removing 80 studies was that tacit knowledge had not been central to them, despite its inclusion 
in the key words list. The centrality of “tacit knowledge” (or its synonyms) to each paper 
examined was determined by the extent to which TK (or its synonyms) was key, rather than 
auxiliary, to each study’s theory development. In addition to the studies returned by the 
database search, we also reviewed an additional 6 studies published in books (Collins, 2010; 
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Polanyi, 1958, 1966b; Ryle, 1949; Tsoukas, 2011). We did this 
because these studies contribute directly to the understanding of TK and, as indicated by 
citation patterns, they have been influential in management studies. In reading each study 




commonalities across them. This exercise (which will be detailed later) enabled us to create an 
organizing framework for our review.  
The review is organized as follows. Firstly, we offer a brief overview of how TK was 
philosophically developed. Following this, we review the management literature on TK and 
identify three perspectives in it. Within each perspective we further distinguish distinct streams 
in which research coalesces. Thirdly, we discuss the common themes across the literature. 
Then, after identifying their similarities, we outline the differences between the three 
perspectives by tracing them to their differing onto-epistemologies. Lastly, we discuss the 
implications of our review for future research. 
Philosophical Foundations of Tacit Knowledge 
The concept of TK was originally formulated and discussed in 20th century philosophy. The 
two philosophers who most  organizational scholars cite when discussing this concept are 
Gilbert Ryle (1949) and Michael Polanyi (1958, 1966b). We briefly review their main 
arguments below. 
In the Concept of Mind, Ryle seeks to argue against an intellectualist understanding of 
knowledge and its relationship to action. An intellectualist approach maintains that action is a 
two-step process. An agent first considers in his/her mind the fitting rules or propositions s/he 
wants to follow or make and, secondly, executes the action. Ryle makes the distinction between 
“know-how” and “know-that” to argue against the intellectualist view. Specifically, know-
how, Ryle notes, is the tacit knowledge one requires to intelligently execute an action, whereas 
know-that is the explicit knowledge about the action (i.e. it describes the execution of action). 
In Ryle’s view, know-how is indispensable for action, while know-that is derivative from 
know-how. In other words, what Ryle argues is that agents do not necessarily need to reflect 




Moreover, Ryle underscores the infinite regress that ensues when thinking is taken to 
necessarily precede acting: even considering the appropriate rules/propositions for action is 
itself a form of action, which, as such, involves know-how. Know-how, therefore, is a 
prerequisite for know-that; tacit knowledge comes first, explicit knowledge follows.  
In The Tacit Dimension and Personal Knowledge, Polanyi makes a similar argument to that of 
Ryle but focuses more on formulating the underlying mechanisms of know-how. Polanyi 
defines know-how as tacit knowledge, or to be more precise, as tacit knowing. In particular, 
Polanyi argues that tacit knowing is not a static body of knowledge, but a perceptual process 
that relies on the integration of “focal” and “subsidiary” awareness. One must attend from 
aspects that are subsidiary to one’s attention in order to be focally aware of something else. For 
example, to recognize someone one must attend from the specific features of their face (e.g. 
nose, eyes, jaw, eyebrows, cheeks, forehead) to recognize the face as a whole. Tacit knowing 
is the process of integrating specific features one is subsidiarily aware of (e.g. features of a 
face), in order to become focally aware of an object (e.g. the face). The integration of subsidiary 
and focal awareness is referred to as indwelling. By stressing that indwelling occurs tacitly, 
Polanyi, like Ryle, maintains that all knowledge is rooted in tacit knowledge (or know-how). 
In Polanyi’s words (1966a, p. 7), “while tacit knowledge can be possessed by itself, explicit 
knowledge must rely on being tacitly understood and applied. Hence all knowledge is either 
tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge. A wholly explicit knowledge is unthinkable”. 
From this very brief review, it follows that tacit knowledge or know-how (also called 
“procedural knowledge”, “implicit knowledge” - see Castillo, 2002, p. 47; Enberg, Lindkvist, 
& Tell, 2006, p. 145; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000, p. 483) is seen by Ryle and Polanyi as the 
ground on which explicit knowledge necessarily rests. No matter how explicit knowledge is, 
insofar as it involves action (i.e. agents integrating subsidiary and focal awareness), it is always 




Polanyi in their efforts to conceptualize and empirically explore TK. As will be seen in the next 
section, a central cause of debate in the field has been how tacit knowledge is related to explicit 
knowledge. Assumptions about the nature of that relationship are inevitably colored by onto-
epistemological commitments.   
The Literature on Tacit Knowledge in Management Research 
In this review, we sought to explore the onto-epistemological assumptions underlying the use 
of TK in each study reviewed. Below, we explain the two-step process we followed. First, we 
searched for the underlying onto-epistemological “image of thought” (Morgan, 1997, p. 4; 
Tsoukas, 2019, p. 3) that underlies the conceptualization of TK in each study. Two images of 
TK were identified. Studies conceive of TK either as an entity that can be converted, 
transmitted, or combined (an intellectualist image) (see, for example, the work of Nonaka, 
1994) or as an accomplishment that integrates subsidiary and focal awareness on an ongoing 
basis (a phenomenological image) (see Tsoukas, 2011).  
Secondly, we searched for the relationship between tacit and explicit knowledge that is argued 
for, or presumed by, each study. Three different types of relationships were identified across 
the reviewed studies. The first type posits that TK can be unconditionally converted to explicit 
knowledge and vice versa, and that either type of knowledge can be used in action. For 
example, a recipe about how to bake bread is considered to be the result of converting a baker’s 
tacit into explicit knowledge. An individual can either use explicit knowledge (i.e. follow the 
steps of the recipe) or, if they possess the requisite skill, draw on their bread-baking know-how 
to bake bread.  
The second type posits that explicit and tacit knowledge must be joined together to perform a 
task. For example, by itself, having explicit knowledge (e.g. a recipe) is not enough to perform 




(e.g. ability to: read the recipe, engage in the bodily movements required, etc.) (Ribeiro & 
Collins, 2007). 
The third type posits that tacit and explicit knowledge are mutually constituted, and that TK 
can only be partially articulated. Articulation is different from conversion: it involves a new 
context, in which the TK that is related to the action under focus is revisited and re-punctuated 
(Tsoukas, 2011). For example, the bread recipe itself is not considered to be the result of 
converting tacit into explicit knowledge. Rather, it is evidence of agents’ ability to partially 
articulate their TK, namely to revisit and re-punctuate key distinctions learned, in a new 
context. Articulation is necessarily partial: TK retains its inexhaustibility – what is articulated 
is not identical with what is (Shotter, 2005; Tsoukas, 2009a, 2011). 
Through this two-steps process, we have identified three perspectives in which, broadly, 
relevant studies fall: the Conversion, the Interactional and the Practice perspective. 
Specifically, studies that conceive of TK as separate from explicit knowledge and assume the 
unconditional conversion of TK into explicit knowledge were grouped under the Conversion 
Perspective (an illustrative example is Nonaka, 1994). Studies that conceive of TK as separate 
from explicit knowledge and assume that TK must be joined together with explicit knowledge 
for a task to be performed were grouped under the Interactional perspective (an illustrative 
example is Cook and Brown, 1999). Finally, studies that conceive of TK as an accomplishment 
and assume the inseparability of tacit and explicit knowledge were grouped under the Practice 
perspective (an illustrative example is Tsoukas, 1996).  
Not all studies we reviewed fitted neatly into the three perspectives. When in doubt, we looked 
closer to the argument at hand to interpret its underlying premises to enable us to make a 




process of judging ambiguous publications, we discuss below three examples, one for each 
perspective.  
First, Sternberg (1997, p. 487) specifies that knowledge can be tacit (“procedural”) or explicit 
(“declarative”), but does not explicitly specify whether TK is convertible. However, Sternberg 
(1997, p.484) suggests a methodology for measuring TK. Measuring tacitness assumes that it 
can be captured through a metric, which treats TK as similar and, therefore, potentially 
convertible, to explicit knowledge. Thus, we judged this study to be closest to the Conversion 
perspective.  
Secondly, Athanassiou and Douglas (1999, p.84) note that knowledge in organizations has two 
dimensions - tacit and explicit – which, the authors argue, are interlinked. The language they 
use implies that the tacit and explicit dimensions must be viewed in tandem. We interpreted 
the emphasis on the links between tacit and explicit knowledge to indicate that this study is 
closest to the Interactional perspective.  
Thirdly, Alvesson and Kärreman (2001) argue that knowledge is tied to community and norms, 
and argue “against the temptation to reduce the knowledge phenomenon into simple sets of 
distinctions” (p.1012). We took the underlying process-cum-practice imagery of their study to 
point to the direction of the Practice perspective. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 Here 
-------------------------- 
 
Prior to discussing the three perspective in depth, it will be useful to offer some descriptive 
information for each. The Conversion perspective is the most popular in the literature: 113 out 
of the 171 (66%) returned studies are included in this perspective. Despite first emerging in the 




qualitative, although, increasingly, recent studies tend to utilize quantitative techniques. The 
locus of study is primarily the individual or aggregates of individuals. Highly influential and 
cited studies of this perspective include Nonaka (1994), Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), and 
Nonaka and von Krogh (2009). 
The Interactional perspective also emerged in the mid-1990s but has been less popular than the 
Conversion perspective. 39 out of the 171 (23%) returned studies are included in this 
perspective. Early studies were theoretical, but scholars gradually turned to using qualitative 
and quantitative methods. The locus of study is the individual-in-interaction-with-the 
collective. Some of the most influential studies include Collins (2010), Cook and Brown 
(1999), and Lam (2000).  
Finally, the Practice perspective is the most recent and, at the same time, the least used. 19 out 
of the 171 (11%) returned studies are included in it. Only one study predates 2000, whereas 
the rest were published post-2000s. Most studies are theoretical, although scholars increasingly 
use qualitative methods to explore TK empirically. The locus of study is the embodied agent 
embedded in practice. Some of the most cited studies include Brown and Duguid (2001), 
Tsoukas (1996), and Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001).  
We consider, in more detail, each of the identified perspectives in turn (for an overview see 
table 2). 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 Here 
-------------------------- 
 
The Conversion Perspective 
By mainly drawing on the work of Polanyi and referring in passing to Ryle, Nonaka (1994) 
popularized the notions of tacit and explicit knowledge in the management literature in the 




1995; Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009) define TK as a type of knowledge that is subjective, largely 
inaccessible to consciousness, and intimately tied to action. In contrast, they define explicit 
knowledge as a type of knowledge that is objective, accessible to consciousness, and in close 
alignment with theory. Nonaka and colleagues (ibid.) argue that the two distinct types of 
knowledge exist at the two ends of a continuum and are, in principle, convertible to each other.  
We have identified four research streams within the Conversion perspective: (i) the 
foundational (10 studies), (ii) the performance (27 studies), (iii) the knowledge management 
(61 studies), and (iv) the strategy stream (15 studies). All four streams  are strongly associated 
to the resource-based view of the firm, namely the view that sees the competitive advantage of 
firms as deriving from how they use their resources and what capabilities they develop 
(Ambrosini & Bowman, 2001; Galunic & Rodan, 1998). As organizational capabilities are at 
the core of the resource-based view, researchers discuss TK not only at an individual level, but 
also at the group/organizational level. Individual TK is viewed as the knowledge that is stored 
in the individual’s cognitive schemata and is hard to express. Group/organizational TK is 
knowledge that is “stored in a collective mind… [It] can be defined as the combination of 
individual cognitive schemata…acquired through mutual experience” (Berman, Down, & Hill, 
2002, p. 16; see also Shamsie & Mannor, 2013, p. 519). The possession of TK is argued to be 
the key to the development of individual expertise and is critical to an organization’s capacity 
to build and sustain a competitive advantage (Berman et al., 2002; Helfat, 1997; Lecuona & 
Reitzig, 2014).  
Over the years quantitative methodologies have become increasingly popular in the Conversion 
perspective. Individual TK is measured through situational judgement tests (Griffith & Sawyer, 
2010, p. 1014; Lievens & Sackett, 2012, p. 463; Sternberg, 1997, p. 484), work samples 
(Sitzmann, Bell, Kraiger, & Kanar, 2009, p. 507), and proxies, such as sequential variety 




measure for group/organizational TK is the “perceived codifiability” of process (Zander & 
Kogut, 1995, p. 88). The measure is used across different studies, albeit with minor adaptations 
(Barthélemy, 2008, p. 1456; Birkinshaw, Nobel, & Ridderstrale, 2002, p. 286; El Arkemi, 
Mignonac, & Perrigot, 2010, p. 937). An example of a proxy used to measure 
group/organizational TK is shared experience (Berman et al., 2002, p. 21; Shamsie & Mannor, 
2013, p. 522). 
 
The Foundational Stream 
The foundational stream is focused on laying out explicitly the onto-epistemological 
assumptions of the Conversion perspective, through theoretical and empirical research that 
demonstrates the mutual convertibility of tacit and explicit knowledge (see Akbar, 2003; Dyck, 
Starke, Mischke, & Mauws, 2005; Nonaka, 1994). The emblematic empirical case has been the 
Matsushita bread-making machine, as reported by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995). Specifically, 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) describe how Matsuhita, an electronics corporation, developed 
the first “fully automated bread-making machine for home use” in Japan in 1987 (p. 95). 
Although Matsuhita faced difficulties with the temperature and some of the ingredients (e.g. 
various flours or yeast), its main problem was to decipher how to knead the dough, which was 
“essentially tacit knowledge possessed by master bakers” (1995, p. 63). To figure out how to 
overcome this problem, Ikuko Tanaka, a Matsushita software developer, was sent to learn how 
to make bread from a master baker. Spending time learning the skill of kneading, Tanaka 
noticed that the baker did not only stretch but also twisted the dough. The latter “turned to be 
the secret of making tasty bread’ (ibid., 1995, p. 64). So, when Tanaka returned to the company, 
she had to explain how dough was kneaded so the engineers could design the machine. In the 
words of Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p.104-105), Tanaka “was able to transfer her knowledge 




Her request for a ‘twisting stretch’ movement was interpreted by the engineers... After a year 
of trial and error… The team came up with product specifications that successfully reproduced 
the head baker’s stretching technique… The team then materialized this concept, putting it 
together into a manual, and embodied it in the product”. 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p.64) use this example as evidence to argue that the master 
baker’s TK would need to be converted to explicit knowledge, through “metaphors, analogies, 
concepts, hypotheses or models”. They further make the more general claim that TK is, in 
principle, convertible. Nonaka and von Krogh (2009) argue that “knowledge must move along 
the continuum from tacit towards…knowledge that eventually becomes knowledge 
independent of the scientist [or person] who created it in the first place”. This is argued to be 
the case not only in technical activities, such as bread making, in which an expert’s TK is 
captured and objectified in the form of a manual or a machine (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995), but 
also in administrative tasks in bureaucratic organizations (Donaldson, 2001), as well as in the 
realm of science, where scientists constantly communicate their findings and claims (Nonaka 
& Von Krogh, 2009). Conversion allows subjective knowledge to become objective through 
being combined with and validated by the knowledge of other individuals (Nonaka, von Krogh, 
& Voelpel, 2006, p. 1182).  
The knowledge conversion process goes through four steps: Socialization, Externalization, 
Combination, and Internalization (SECI) (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 61–70). In 
socialization, individuals are posited to interact (e.g. master baker and Tanaka). In 
externalization, individuals articulate TK into explicit terms (e.g. via metaphors). In 
Combination, people combine different bodies of explicit knowledge (e.g. ‘twisting-stretch’ 
metaphor combined with engineering knowledge). Finally, in Internalization, explicit 
knowledge is embodied into TK (e.g. the new understanding of bread kneading is taken for 




a cycle of knowledge conversion is finished, another may begin (von Krogh, Nonaka, & 
Rechsteiner, 2012, p. 242). 
Other foundational studies have sought to confirm or build on the SECI model across diverse 
organizational settings, beyond Japanese technological firms (see Akbar, 2003; Kidd, 1998, p. 
144). Akbar and Tzokas (2013, p. 248) highlight that the mutual convertibility between tacit 
and explicit knowledge is key to new product/service development. Like Nonaka and his 
associates, they argue that, during new product/service development, new knowledge is created 
through several phases, involving both socialization and explication processes. Similarly, Dyck 
and colleagues (2005) have confirmed that knowledge creation in a small manufacturing firm 
goes through all four SECI processes.  
Several assumptions underlie the Nonakian conception of TK. Firstly, knowledge sits on a 
continuum ranging from tacit to explicit, with some knowledge aspects more tacit than others 
(Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009). Secondly, TK is theorized to be, initially at least, subjective, 
since it resides within individuals (see also Kogut & Zander, 1992). As Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995, p. 239) note, “only individuals think”. And thirdly, through conversion, TK can become 
objectified through language and diffused across individuals. For instance, Tanaka transferred 
the master baker’s technique by capturing it through the ‘twisting-stretch’ metaphor; the 
engineers further objectified the metaphor by translating it into engineering knowledge, 
following a year of trial and error.  
The Performance Stream 
Studies in the performance stream highlight that TK is implicated in performance at both the 
organizational/group and individual levels, which makes TK hard to imitate and transfer. 
Quantitative studies typically use the measures or proxies described above. Below, we consider 




Tacit Knowledge and Performance at the Organizational/Group Level. Several studies have 
shown that TK is related to organizational performance. Although the mechanism that connects 
the two is not explicitly specified, it is assumed that, just like at the individual level, 
organizational/group level TK makes team performance more fluent and discerning by creating 
common knowledge that is internalized and spontaneously available to team members (see 
Nonaka, 1994, pp. 16–17). Thus, in 250 teams across a Fortune 100 technology company, TK 
has been found to be related to customer satisfaction and manager-assessed performance 
(Griffith & Sawyer, 2010, p. 1022). The authors (ibid, p. 1010) theorized that the reason for 
the relationship of TK with team performance is because teams have “access to more overall 
tacit knowledge through their individual members”. Similarly, research into basketball teams 
(data from 23 National Basketball Association teams from 1980 to 1994) and US baseball 
teams (data from 30 Major League Baseball teams from 1985 to 2001) has shown that TK is 
linked to teams’ performance. As players in teams spend more time playing together, they 
generate and build up TK, which leads to greater performance (Berman et al., 2002; Shamsie 
& Mannor, 2013). However, this effect does not continue indefinitely. After a certain point, 
accumulation of shared experience is shown to negatively affect performance. This is because 
after a period of success, maintaining the same approach may lead the team to perform 
inflexibly. To combat this, an occasional change in the roster is recommended (Berman et al., 
2002).  
Researchers argue that TK contributes to the uniqueness of firms, which, in turn, assists 
performance (see Bloodgood et al., 2003; Mueller, 1996). In particular, TK was found to be 
linked to the ability of a firm to create new products in the petroleum industry, which was 
associated with sustaining a completive advantage (see Helfat, 1997). Even corporate spin-offs 
were found to grow more when they initially have “a specific narrow-focused technology 




which is tacit ” (Clarysse et al., 2011, p. 1420). Companies that divest or spinoff their original 
or legacy business have been found to have a lower performance than firms that retain them 
because they lose their TK (Feldman, 2014). Similarly, the market performance of firms that 
rely on outsourcing was shown to be negatively affected due to losing out on TK and the 
associated knowledge that is generated through learning-by-doing (Weigelt, 2009). 
Organizations that are part of an alliance and have an increased ability to acquire know-how 
from their partners enjoy higher stock performance in comparison to their partners (Yang et 
al., 2015). However, not all TK is argued to be equally useful for organizations. A study by 
Lecuona and Reitzig (2014) suggests that personnel with firm specific TK are more likely to 
benefit organizations, rather than personnel that have general TK. 
Tacit Knowledge and Performance at the Individual Level. TK and individual performance 
have been consistently linked in various studies. As members of organizations, individuals are 
typically limited to specific actions that form the basis for constructing work processes 
(Pentland, 2003, p. 530). Pentland (2003, p. 528) suggests that sequential variety (“variability 
in the sequence of steps used to perform a work process”) provides an index for TK. The author 
argues that process variation is key to performance viability in environments where flexibility 
is important (p.529). For example, sequential variety may be key to performance in customer 
service. In such a role, individual employees must change their response based on diverse 
customer needs. In the case of entrepreneurs, Baum and colleagues (2011, p. 402), found that 
individual practical intelligence (of which TK is a major component), in combination with 
business growth goals, predict higher venture growth across 4 years. Baldwin et al (2011) noted 
that, despite the enormous development of formal knowledge about management, both 
managers (sample size 21,319) and students (sample size 2,644) had “a disturbingly low level” 
of knowing how to apply it. Such a weak ability was found to have only a modest relationship 




unless knowledge about something (in this case, management) has become tacit, individual 
performance will be limited. On this note, Burke and Sadler-Smith (2006) have argued that the 
ability of instructors to convert their TK into explicit knowledge tends to increase the value of 
instructor performance.  
Several studies have claimed that TK is related to the effectiveness of individual judgements 
(measured by situational judgement tests) and job performance (Motowidlo & Beier, 2010, p. 
331; Sternberg, 1997). Along the same lines, results from situational judgement tests have been 
argued to be significant predictors of job performance (Christian, Edwards, & Bradley, 2010; 
Lievens & Patterson, 2011; Weekley & Casey, 1999). In one study, Lievens and Sackett (2012) 
followed medical students over their time as interns and then as employees. They found that 
TK about interpersonal relationships, as measured by a situational judgement test, is a valid 
predictor of job performance up to 9 years after administrating the first test. It should be noted 
that as a predictor of interpersonal relationships tests, TK was found to have incremental 
validity over cognitive factors for predicting academic and post-academic success criteria 
(Lievens & Sackett, 2012, p. 461).  
The Knowledge Management Stream 
Given its links to performance, TK is seen to be a valuable resource. Consequently, a lot of 
interest has been generated about how knowledge as a resource could be managed and diffused 
within and across organizations (see Fey & Furu, 2008). Studies in the knowledge management 
stream focus on how TK conversion enables the diffusion of knowledge in and across 
organizations. They have tended to employ quantitative methodologies.  
TK has been argued to “come packaged most efficiently in the form of individuals” (Hedlund, 
1994, p. 79). The organizational importance of TK possessed by individuals who were hired 




This is because these individuals continued to be involved in how the organization used their 
ideas in the long term (J. Singh & Agrawal, 2011, p. 145). Researchers were surprised by this 
finding because they expected that the TK of the hired individual would be shared throughout 
the organization. It was assumed that if the recruit’s TK was shared, their involvement in 
projects would not be required in the long term. This finding was explained by suggesting that 
the TK of individuals remains restricted to direct (rather than indirect) contacts (Burt, 2007; H. 
Singh, Dryscynski, Li, & Ram, 2016). Because the TK of the newly hired individuals is not 
transferred throughout the organization, their importance in projects remains intact.  
When individuals work in the same field but work for organizations in different cultural 
settings, they were found to have difficulties understanding each other (Lam, 1997). Similar 
problems have been documented in organizational mergers (Leroy & Ramanantsoa, 1997), and 
expatriate managers adjusting to different cultures (Armstrong & Li, 2017). Huang and 
colleagues (2014), have also found this to be the case when staff, with different sets of 
expertise, are called to collaborate. The difficulties are largely attributed to different 
cultures/communities developing their “own separate TK environment[s]” (Lehrer & 
Asakawa, 2003, p. 788)  
Although TK is portrayed as a type of non-systematized and non-disseminated knowledge that 
impedes knowledge transfer (Inkpen & Pien, 2006, p. 781), it is argued that TK is amenable to 
conversion to explicit knowledge. This, in turn, facilitates TK to be shared across and within 
organizations (Enberg et al., 2006; Feller et al., 2013; Kale & Singh, 2007). Explicit knowledge 
is understood as “codifiable knowledge that can be transmitted without loss of integrity, once 
the syntactical rules required for deciphering it are known. It includes facts, axiomatic 
propositions, and symbols” (Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000, p. 221). Thus, conversion 




985) and turning their TK to “rules and procedures” (P. Thompson, Warhurst, & Callaghan, 
2001, p. 927). In response to the above, some researchers have argued that developing a 
formalized knowledge system is especially helpful for organizations (Coff, Coff, & Eastvold, 
2006; Salisbury, 2001; Trantopoulos, von Krogh, Wallin, & Woerter, 2017). Lee and Van den 
Steen (2010) maintain that the development of a formalized knowledge system is even more 
beneficial when organizations are large, face problems such as turnover, and rely on specialist 
knowledge. To create formalized knowledge systems, the conversion of TK to explicit 
knowledge tends to be required.  
Strategic decisions that influence the conversion and transfer of TK have been identified. Tsang 
(2002) maintains that TK transfer is positively affected by management overseeing, and being 
involved in, the processes of knowledge diffusion. When partners are directly involved and 
oversee international joint ventures, this increases the opportunities for learning, which, in turn, 
is associated with higher knowledge transfer (Tsang, 2002, p. 838). However, evidence 
suggests that the transfer of  TK is more effective during the initiation of the transfer process 
rather than during the implementation phase (Szulanski, Ringov, & Jensen, 2016). Early 
involvement in the process allows the involved parties to identify potential problems to the 
transfer process earlier. In turn, this increases the likelihood of mitigating identified problems 
early on, which can significantly decrease transfer costs (Szulanski et al. 2016, p. 308).  
Several teaching methods that influence the diffusion of TK have been identified. TK can be 
transferred to employees by web-based means (i.e. via the computer using the internet) or 
traditional classroom teaching techniques. A meta-analysis has suggested that conveying TK 
through teaching is equally effective in both web-based and classroom instruction (Sitzmann, 
Kraiger, Stewart, & Wisher, 2006). In addition, a meta-analysis has found that computer based 
simulation games are positively related to the transfer of TK (Sitzmann, 2011). Sitzman’s 




instructional methods. However, Sitzman (2011) notes that the aforementioned results show 
evidence of publication bias. The transfer of TK can be more efficient via other instructional 
methods when the trainees are actively involved in the learning experience. According to 
Wollersheim and colleagues (2016), TK transfer is limited by knowledge scope. Specifically, 
Wollersheim et al (2016) found that providing a high number of training interventions does not 
necessarily result in imparting more TK when the objective of interventions is to teach 
employees a whole range of organizational  processes. 
Trust and emotions have been argued to affect TK transfer. Higher trust between the individual 
and the firm is consistently found to positively affect TK transfer (Becerra, Lunnan, & Huemer, 
2008; Levin & Cross, 2004; J. J. Li, Poppo, & Zhou, 2010). In contrast, opportunistic behavior 
was found to hinder TK transfer (Barthélemy, 2008; El Arkemi et al., 2010). Moreover, sharing 
TK is linked to a fear of power loss (Chuang, Jackson, & Jiang, 2016, p. 544). It is argued that 
individuals need to be motivated to share their TK (Osterloh & Frey, 2000).  
To assist knowledge sharing it is suggested that individuals of the interested parties should 
spend time with each other (Kale et al., 2000) - increased geographical proximity is assumed 
to facilitate the sharing process (Choudhury, 2017; Fabrizio & Thomas, 2012; Fu, 2012; Van 
Den Bulte & Moenaert, 1998). It is theorized that the latter occurs because the transfer of TK 
is “often dependent on informal interactions among individuals and organizations” (Fey & 
Furu, 2008, p. 1314), especially when the expectation of reciprocity exists (Kachra & White, 
2008). 
The Strategy Stream 
Studies in the strategy stream focus on exploring how TK as a valuable resource affects 
organizational strategy. Strategic decisions affected by TK range from market entry and 




share TK in and across organizations (see Gray, Siemsen, & Vasudeva, 2015; Le Breton-Miller 
& Miller, 2015; Nagarajan & Mitchell, 1998). The stream is dominated by the use of 
quantitative methodologies. 
Consistent with the view that TK is unique, research has suggested that organizational 
expansion abroad (X. Martin & Salomon, 2003) or seeking strategic partners (Shenkar & Li, 
1999) is motivated by the acquisition of TK. Gray et al (2015) have found that, to facilitate TK 
appropriation in the long-run, the colocation of manufacturing and R&D in pharmaceuticals is 
related to better conformance quality, despite the rapid development of information systems 
that enable work at a distance. This is because it is harder to appropriate TK when working at 
a distance (ibid., p.2764). The entry choices into foreign markets by small to medium 
enterprises with a high stock of proprietary TK have been found to be moderated by formal 
institutional risk (i.e. “constraints resulting from insufficiently developed market support 
institutions in the host country”) (Schwens, Eiche, & Kabst, 2011, p. 331). Specifically, when 
formal institutional risk is high, firms with high proprietary TK are more likely to secure 
knowledge internally rather than externally. This safeguards TK from expropriation from 
opportunistic behavior of foreign competitors (ibid, p.344). However, market entry is not only 
motivated by knowledge acquisition. Kim and Kogut (1996) have illustrated that organizations 
engaged in developing platform technology, enter new markets by drawing on their own TK 
acquired from technological experience. Because the latter has a large range of applicability, it 
allows them to identify new opportunities and thus diversify.  
TK and its sourcing are linked to inter-firm agreements (e.g. alliances) and organizational 
forms (e.g. integration of departments). Birkinshaw and colleagues (2002) found that the 
degree of knowledge tacitness has an influence on organizational forms. Specifically, it was 
found that a lower degree of knowledge tacitness is associated wither a lower likeliness of 




transfer. Hence, R&D departments with low tacitness of knowledge are given autonomy 
because their knowledge can be easily shared (ibid, p. 278). Dutta and Weiss (1997) maintain 
that technologically innovative firms must guard their TK (see also Schwens et al., 2011), since 
it is a unique asset that differentiates a firm from competition. Thus, firms try to prevent TK 
from spilling over to other firms operating in the same country. Therefore, to safeguard their 
TK, firms tend to engage more in marketing agreements and licensing agreements than joint 
ventures. This is because marketing and licensing agreements minimize the transfer of TK 
(Dutta & Weiss, 1997). The higher the perceived threat of opportunism, the more likely it is 
for firms to make an acquisition rather than to sign a licensing agreement. Acquisitions ensure 
that TK remain within firm boundaries, whereas licensing does not.  
Moreover, Almeida and colleagues (2002) found that in the semi-conductor industry, 
multinational corporations (MNCs) are a superior arrangement to alliances and market-based 
relationships for moving, integrating and developing new technical knowledge (which contains 
both explicit and tacit knowledge). The authors argue that MNCs are superior, because they 
can use multiple ways of knowledge transfer (e.g. formal means such as explicit knowledge in 
reports and informal means such as discussions), which assist in integrating and developing 
new technical knowledge (Almeida et al., 2002, p.158). 
The Interactional Perspective 
The Interactional perspective shares some commonalities with the Conversion perspective but 
differs from it in some important ways. The commonalities include, mainly, the acceptance of 
tacit and explicit knowledge as two separate types of knowledge and their mutual convertibility 
(see Kamoche, Beise-Zee, & Mamman, 2014, pp. 1379, 1383). However, whereas for the 
Conversion perspective convertibility is unconditional, for the Interaction perspective, it is 




after conversion, converted knowledge by itself may not be enough to perform an action) 
(Collins, 2006). For example, making a robot that can cycle is dependent on science 
understanding the physics and mathematics of cycling, especially balancing on a bicycle. 
However, the equations of cycling cannot directly be used by humans to cycle. Humans require 
embodied tacit knowledge to do so. The defining feature of this perspective, therefore, is the 
assumption that in order to perform an action, different knowledge types need to be joined 
together. Thus, to ride a bicycle one needs not only individual embodied TK to balance on it 
but, also, collective TK: the norms that govern cycling in traffic (Collins, 2010). In our review, 
we have identified two streams within the Interactional perspective: the foundational (12 
studies) and knowledge sharing (27 studies) streams. 
The Foundational Stream 
Relevant studies focus on articulating and elaborating the onto-epistemological assumptions 
that underpin the Interactional perspective, having a mainly theoretical focus. An influential 
advocate of this perspective has been Harry Collins (2010), who suggests that TK is only  
conditionally (or pragmatically)  convertible. Advocates of conditional  conversion accept that 
TK may be, in principle, convertible to explicit knowledge (i.e. under specific conditions, such 
as advances in technology), but, they also insist that, even when conversion occurs, individuals 
cannot always use explicit knowledge to perform a task (see Collins, 2006). Task performance 
is made possible insofar as TK, in its various types, is joined together with explicit knowledge 
(see Cook & Brown, 1999). Collins (2010) identifies three TK types and suggests why they are 
difficult to convert, and, furthermore, why, in some cases, even converted TK may not be 
usable in itself.  
The first type of TK is relational TK. This type is argued to be embedded in human 




to Collins (2010, pp. 91–92), if some people (e.g. craftspersons) have knowledge of something 
and want to keep it to themselves, there is little chance of others finding out about it, unless the 
people choose to share their piece of knowledge. Thus, Collins argues, this ‘secret’ knowledge 
is, in essence TK, which cannot be explicated, nor used, unless shared by the people who 
possess it.  
The second type of TK is somatic TK. This is similar to “skill-based” TK outlined by Cook 
and Brown (1999, p. 391), Lam’s (2000, p. 492) “embodied” TK, and Tywoniak’s (2007, p. 
61) “personal” TK. This type of TK, is related to humans’ bodily abilities and is hard to 
explicate. Even sophisticated technologies cannot adequately capture, nor fully replicate, the 
complexity of human bodies and the knowledge inscribed in them (Collins, 2010, p. 101). 
Hence, Collins (2006, p. 258) argues, with reference to the cycling example, insofar as the 
equation explaining balancing on a bicycle has been formulated and it has been put to use by 
bicycle riding robots, this is enough evidence to suggest that know-how can exist in different 
types: somatic (tacit) (for humans) and mechanical (explicit) (for robots). However, the 
mechanical type cannot be used by humans because they do not process information the way 
robots do. 
The third type of tacit knowledge is collective TK, also referred to by others as “group TK”, 
“collective knowledge” or “organizational memory” (Cook & Brown, 1999; Hecker, 2012; 
Kayes, 2002; Lam, 2000; Lei, Hitt, & Bettis, 1996; Tywoniak, 2007). This is essentially the 
taken-for-granted “shared beliefs” within communities of practice (Tell, 2004; Williams, 2001, 
p. 73). According to Collins (2006), the inherent difficulty with converting this type of TK 
stems from its incessantly changing nature. Thus, although, in principle, collective TK is 





Interactionalists suggest that, although distinct, tacit and explicit knowledge “interact” (see 
Kayes, 2002, p. 145; Tywoniak, 2007, p. 54). Indeed, it is maintained that it is by joining 
together all knowledge types that the possibility for action and new knowledge creation exists 
(Collins, 2010; Cook & Brown, 1999; Miller, Zhao, & Calantone, 2006, p. 719; Raelin, 2007, 
p. 505). Take for example, the creation of the bread-making machine described by Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995). Even after Tanaka used the metaphor of the twisting-stretch to explain how 
the master bread maker dealt with the dough, the engineers could not still comprehend what 
Tanaka meant. To combat their incomprehension, the engineers spent time with the baker to 
gain haptic experience of dough kneading (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 104). This suggests 
that, to develop the bread-making machine, engineers did not rely only on Tanaka’s explicit 
knowledge (i.e. her verbal description). Rather, the engineers had to join together Tanaka’s 
explicit knowledge, as expressed through her twisting-stretch metaphor, with their own somatic 
TK of handling the dough and with their collective TK of how to socially interact with the 
bakers and Tanaka. This is why, Ribeiro and Collins (2007, p. 1429) argue that the bread-
making machine was designed through joining together knowledge types (i.e. collective TK 
with somatic TK), not through knowledge conversion. Thus, to create the bread making 
machine, the engineers had to join together individual explicit (e.g. metaphor) and tacit (e.g. 
haptic experience of kneading) knowledge and collective types of explicit (e.g. formal 
terminology) and tacit (e.g. conventions for interacting) knowledge. 
According to Cook and Brown (1999, p. 388), the types of knowledge that are joined together 
in action should be considered “as an aid to action, not part of action itself”. During action, 
what agents draw upon is knowing. Knowing is defined as know-how-in-action, which is used 
to achieve a specific purpose. Thus, TK, for Cook and Brown (1999), is considered to consist 




during action. Hence, a number of authors hold that “knowledge is mental content” that is 
utilized for decisions during action (Dörfler & Ackermann, 2012, p. 551).  
The Knowledge Sharing Stream 
Similar to studies in the Conversion perspective, Interactional studies also recognize the 
importance of TK for sustaining a competitive advantage (Ebbers & Wijnberg, 2009; Hall, 
1992). Thus, how knowledge is shared in and across organizations has been a major focus for 
researchers in this perspective. Since Interactionalists assume pragmatic conversion and the 
joining of distinct knowledge types together, a significant number of scholars have presented 
arguments for how TK is shared without conversion. Most empirical studies are either 
theoretical or qualitative.  
Interactionalist researchers hold that TK is transferred via direct interaction between people 
over a period of time, during which people tacitly begin to acquire more and more 
understanding through experience and experimentation (Cunliffe, 2002; Raelin, 1997; Styhre, 
Josephson, & Knauseder, 2006). Both collective and individual TK are key for knowledge 
sharing, since : (i) the different types of knowledge must be joined together in order to develop 
expertise and perform tasks (Arnold, Clark, Collier, Leech, & Sutton, 2006, p. 84; A. Martin, 
Woods, & Dawkins, 2015, p. 53; McCloy, Campbell, & Cudeck, 1994; Ribeiro & Collins, 
2007; Williams, 2001), and (ii) TK is embedded within specific contexts and, therefore, cannot 
be abstracted without losing its contextual nuances (Almond, 2011; Hong, 2012; Lei et al., 
1996).  
During knowledge transfer, rather than conversion, what occurs is knowledge bridging (Hong, 
2012; Rouleau, 2005). By drawing on collective TK, agents seek to bridge their knowledge 
gaps through dialogue in interactional contexts (Gerpott, Lehmann-Willenbrock, & Voelpel, 




set up and dialogue is conducted are underwritten by collective TK (see Cook & Brown, 1999). 
This suggests that, apart from individual TK, collective TK (i.e. knowledge embedded in 
organizational systems and culture) also differentiates firms. This is because collective TK 
produces spontaneous ways of cooperating that are hard to imitate (Mueller, 1996, p. 773). 
Cattani and colleagues (2013, p. 814), in a study of violin making, argue that TK is transferred 
“most effectively by direct observation, participation and close interaction” (see also Kamoche 
& Maguire, 2011; Ribeiro & Collins, 2007). If a skill is not practiced, TK may be lost, even if 
explicit instructions exist. Insofar as this is the case, TK must be reinvented (Cattani et al., 
2013).  
As sharing TK is complex and time consuming (Spencer, 2008, p. 347), it is argued that 
creating suitable conditions to facilitate knowledge transfer is helpful. At an organizational 
level, forming alliances with or acquiring other firms has been argued to affect knowledge 
transfer (Gerwin & Ferris, 2004; Schweizer, 2005). In the context of the acquisition of biotech 
firms by pharmaceutical companies, the autonomy given to the acquired was a key factor for 
knowledge transfer (Schweizer, 2005). Higher autonomy is given when the acquisition is 
motivated by accessing new knowledge, whereas lower autonomy is provided when the 
acquisition is motivated by improving market position. The reason for this is this: know-how 
is tied to (embedded in) organizational systems and culture. When acquisition is motivated by 
accessing new knowledge, changing the organizational systems and culture may jeopardize the 
newly acquired know-how. However, when acquisition is motivated by improving market 
position, changing the organizational systems and culture of the acquired organization will not 
jeopardize losing the relevant know-how, because the acquiring organization already has it 
(Schweizer, 2005, p.1068). 
Interactionalists, like Conversionists, maintain that trust and emotions are key to transferring 




transfer when they perceived a common advantage in doing so (Ivory, Alderman, Thwaites, 
McLoughlin, & Vaughan, 2007), or when their sense of identity was not perceived to be 
threatened (Kamoche et al., 2014). If these conditions are not upheld, individuals may choose 
to protect their TK by not sharing it (Kamoche et al., 2014). According to Ebbers and Wijnberg 
(2009), organizational memory not only contains declarative and procedural knowledge, but 
also knowledge of expectations. If individuals’ expectations are violated, they are likely to seek 
to protect their knowledge, focusing, instead, on their individual advancement (ibid.). 
Protecting TK has been argued to be a type of “silence” (similar to Collin’s (2010) concept of 
relational TK discussed above). In particular, two types of silence have been identified. On the 
one hand, when staff are unable to articulate their knowledge, this is referred to as being 
“silent”. On the other hand, when staff are unwilling to articulate their knowledge is referred 
to as being “silenced” (Blackman & Sadler-Smith, 2009, p. 571). 
The Practice Perspective 
The Practice perspective is the least used of the three we have identified in our review. Its 
distinguishing features are the following three: (i) tacit and explicit knowledge are irreducible 
and mutually constituted; (ii) TK and sociomaterial practices are inseparable, and (iii) 
embodiment matters (Tsoukas, 2011). Accordingly, the locus of study is the embodied agent 
embedded in practice. To see best how the Practice perspective views TK, we revisit the bread 
making illustration used throughout this review.  
For Tanaka to express how the master-baker kneaded bread, she relied on her understanding 
derived from personally observing and participating in the bread making sociomaterial 
practice. Through the twisting-stretch metaphor, Tanaka did not convert, nor translate, her TK 
into explicit knowledge. Rather, Tanaka reflected on her embodied experience and partly 




by language; several aspects of an agent’s experience remain inexpressible or partially 
expressible (e.g. the haptic feeling of kneading dough) (see Ribeiro & Collins, 2007, p.1429). 
Language shapes – gives form – rather than converts or translates one’s experience (Rorty, 
1979). The twisting-stretch metaphor was Tanaka’s way of making sense of her own 
experience in a publicly communicable manner. By articulating her experience through this 
metaphor, she brought forward and underscored particular aspects of her experience. 
Language, therefore, provided a particular form to Tanaka’s experience. The engineers, 
initially, had trouble fully understanding what Tanaka meant by the metaphor and what the 
implications were. They had to participate in the bread making sociomaterial practice 
themselves in order to comprehend what Tanaka was referring to and see possibilities for 
action. The development of the bread making machine would have been impossible without all 
parties dwelling in their own TK and finding ways of partly articulating and sharing it.  
Research from a Practice perspective has been, mainly, theoretical or qualitatively empirical. 
We have identified two streams in our review: the foundational (12 studies), and the skillful 
performance stream (7 studies). Below we consider each. 
The Foundational Stream 
Several management scholars have engaged with Polanyi’s original work (1958, 1966b), 
attempting to show its implications for organizations. Thus, they have been keen to point out 
that TK is not a body of rules, but a process that relies on the spontaneous tacit integration of 
focal and subsidiary awareness, as discussed earlier (Miller, 2008; Shotter, 2005; Tsoukas, 
2011). In skilled work, such as, for example, a carpenter hammering a nail, driving the nail 
down is the focus of his/her attention, while, at the same time, s/he is subsidiarily aware of the 
feeling in the palm of holding the hammer. As Polanyi and Prosch (1977, p. 33) remark: “I 




hitting the nail. I may say that I have a subsidiary awareness of the feelings in my hand which 
is merged into my focal awareness of my driving the nail” (italics in the original).   
Focal and subsidiary awareness have a from-to relationship: agents must attend from subsidiary 
aspects of their experience to become focally aware of an object (Polanyi & Prosch, 1977; 
Tsoukas, 1996, 2011). As Tsoukas (2011, p. 461) remarks: “tacit knowing is from-to knowing: 
we humans know the particulars by relying on our awareness of them for attending to 
something else”. If agents focus on one of the features of their subsidiary awareness, they lose 
sight of what they are focally aware of, just like when focusing on grammar while speaking 
jeopardizes its fluency.  
As discussed earlier, the process of an agent interiorizing the subsidiary aspects from which 
s/he attends to perceive something, is referred to as ‘indwelling’ (D’Eredita & Barreto, 2006; 
Gueldenberg & Helting, 2007; Miller, 2008; Tsoukas, 2009a). Oborn and Dawson (2010) have 
suggested that the process of indwelling allows cross-functional medical teams (i.e. surgeons 
and radiologists) in a British hospital to make decisions about complex treatments. By dwelling 
in different details, medical specialists could bring into focus different understandings, which, 
through dialogue, allowed teams to make more informed decisions about treatment (ibid., p. 
1842-43). 
Indwelling is accomplished through socialization into a sociomaterial practice (Brown & 
Duguid, 2001). To become a practitioner, say a teacher, a doctor or a design engineer, a person 
must learn to normatively use language, shared standards of excellence, routines and 
terminologies that are taken for granted by their peers (Pyrko, Dörfler, & Eden, 2017). Thus, 
to become a member of a practice, “is to experience one’s situation in terms of already 
constituted distinctions” (Tsoukas, 2009a, p. 943, emphasis in original). The backbone of 




do (Gueldenberg & Helting, 2007). When something is taken for granted, indwelling is in 
process (Shotter, 2005, p. 601). Indwelling structures agents’ perception by enabling them to 
attend from subsidiary particulars (e.g. particular terminology or certain standards of 
excellence) to the focal situation at hand. Put differently, against this tacit background, 
possibilities and impossibilities for action are opened and closed depending on what is 
routinely acceptable or unacceptable comportment within a community of practice 
(Gueldenberg & Helting, 2007). For example, when doctors discuss possible treatments, they 
do so by dwelling in the shared medical understanding and the legitimate sources of knowledge 
(e.g. journals) (see Oborn & Dawson, 2010).   
Through socialization into a practice, we attain “particular skills through training our bodies to 
relate in certain ways to the world” (Tsoukas, 1996, p. 17, emphasis added). Action is enabled 
or directly carried out by our bodies, whose senses, most of the time, are drawn upon in a 
subsidiary manner: we subsidiarily attend from the senses to focally perceive and respond to 
situations. We are normally unaware of the movement of our eye muscles when we observe, 
the movements of our mouths and tongues when we speak, the distance we keep from others, 
how our mouth curls in response to a joke, and so on (Tsoukas, 2011, p. 462).  
Indeed, we are normally unaware that tasks that require even a fragment of specialized 
knowledge also require a series of bodily functions. To illustrate this Tsoukas  (2011, p. 462) 
refers to Polanyi’s (1958, p. 101) example of how medical students learn to diagnose 
pulmonary diseases by using X-rays. Students are initially puzzled. Looking at the X-ray 
picture of a chest, they can see “only the shadows of the heart and ribs, with a few spidery 
blotches between them” (Polanyi, 1958, p.101, as quoted in Tsoukas, 2011, p. 462). Initially, 
students find nearly incomprehensible what the teaching radiologist is talking about. They have 
not learned yet how to observe an X-ray because they do not know what to look for. If, 




to see the lungs. With more time and even more perseverance, “a rich panorama of significant 
details will be revealed to [them]: of physiological variations and pathological changes, of 
scars, of chronic infections and signs of acute disease. [They have] entered a new world” (ibid.). 
Thus, students learn, in practice and through practice, to ‘see’, that is, they learn which aspects 
of the X-ray to attend by internalizing normative distinctions from the practice of radiology. 
By doing so, what was initially an unclear picture of blotches appears to be a meaningful 
ensemble of a lung. Thus, more broadly, carrying out tasks ranging from trivial, such as reading 
the newspaper, through those involving moderate skills, such as driving, to specialized ones, 
such as cancer research, and/or architecture and design, requires the tacit integration of 
normative distinctions permitted by our bodily functions. 
Following from the above, whenever agents are engaged in action, they do so without being 
focally aware of the subsidiary elements they are attending from (Shotter, 2005; Tsoukas, 
1996). However, the open-endedness of the social world (i.e. agents are constantly faced with 
novel situations) calls for novel responses (Shotter & Tsoukas, 2014). Insofar as situations 
diverge from what is typically expected, they often result in ‘breakdowns’ in agents’ 
performances (Tsoukas, 2011), bringing engaged action to a halt. During such breakdowns 
agents bring forward (i.e. become focally aware of) what, during action, they took to be 
subsidiary particulars, in order to articulate (and, therefore, re-punctuate) them, and find a new 
way to continue their action in congruence with their practice (Tsoukas, 2009a, 2011). For 
example, during a lecture, an eerily silent class may cause a teacher to revisit the particular 
examples they have been using (Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009, p. 1355).  
Reflecting on and articulating what one was subsidiarily aware of during action is an endless 
process (Brown & Duguid, 2001, p. 204). “Rationality can never be fully articulated; it always 
has a tacit dimension”  (Miller, 2008, p. 945). Articulation depends on reflection, and reflection 




something one must already dwell in a specific set of subsidiary particulars. Hence, even when 
agents retrospectively offer explicit insights into their performance, their articulation depends 
on tacitly taking for granted a host of other subsidiary (i.e. unarticulated) particulars. 
Consequently, explicit and tacit knowledge are not (cannot be) separate – they are mutually 
constituted (Spender, 2008). In Tsoukas’ (2011, p. 472) words: “tacit and explicit knowledge 
are not the two ends of a continuum but two sides of the same coin: even the most explicit kind 
of knowledge is underlain by tacit knowledge.” 
The Skilful Performance Stream 
Studies in this stream focus on exploring how individuals experience and enact different skills 
across different practices. All studies are qualitative. They share the assumption that skillful 
performance depends on dwelling in contextual nuances (e.g. local conventions, unique 
circumstances).  
Ιn a study of a call center of a major Greek telecommunication company, it was found  that the 
effective performance of employees was accomplished not simply by following organizational 
rules (i.e. some general statements abstracted from context) but by employees constantly 
adapting rules to particular contexts through drawing on collectively shared  taken-for-granted 
ways of doing things (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 983). For example, although two 
customers may have the same query, the operator may not approach both in the same way, 
especially if the one customer is calm and the other is frustrated. Although the same solution 
may be proposed, the operator must use a different approach if s/he wants to effectively address 
the particular customer’s concern.  
These findings are supported by an action research study of Martensson and Lee (2004), which 
focused on how Martensson and the managing director of a European company interacted 




experience, expertise, and tacit knowledge, or praxis, largely shapes how he understands the 
suggested actions and appropriates them as his own” (ibid., p.507). Through dialogical 
interaction, the practitioner learned about organizational theory from the researcher. However 
to use theory, the director had to “read the situation at hand” and judge how the theory could 
be applied in relation to the organization’s unique circumstances. As Shotter and Tsoukas 
(2014) show, to be able to judge effectively (especially in ambiguous situations), individuals 
not only harness technical skills and taken for granted values (e.g. concerning justice), but they 
also attend to their emotions. 
Indeed, a key reason that skillful performance depends on contextual nuances is because 
individuals become skilled through socialization in sociomaterial practices. In an empirical 
study of the UK National Health System, Pyrko and colleagues (2017, p. 390) illustrate that 
for communities of practice to function, practitioners need to “think together”. The latter is 
achieved by learning “to be interlocked on the same cue”. In other words, to skillfully carry 
out a task in alignment to others’ actions, requires individuals to dwell in the same subsidiary 
particulars, since such indwelling enables individuals to share their focal awareness. For 
example, for doctors to discuss the details of carrying out a procedure (e.g. nephrostomy) on a 
patient, they must share the same understanding (Oborn & Dawson, 2010). Likewise, in an 
empirical study of corporate lawyers, it was shown that practice is so interlocked with taken-
for-granted knowledge that professional competence should properly be understood as a way-
of-being that enables the spontaneous relating of lawyers to arising situations, based on tacit 
professional understandings (Sandberg & Pinnington, 2009).  Similarly, Gherardi and Nicolini 
(2000), illustrate that the proliferation of safety knowledge in the Italian construction industry 
is a matter of ongoing socialization via repeated micro interactions among staff. Although 
individuals may initially have different conceptions of safety, they gradually learn to perform 





In this review, our main goal  has been  to grasp the different understandings of tacit knowledge 
in management and organizational research, trace them to the onto-epistemological 
assumptions researchers make concerning the nature of knowledge and action, and suggest a 
framework that enables researchers to get a coherent understanding of the diverse literature. In 
this section, we discuss (i) the commonalities and differences between the three perspectives 
identified, (ii) methodological implications, and (iii) directions for future research. 
Commonalities across the Three Perspectives on Tacit Knowledge 
We identify three common themes across the three perspectives: firstly, TK is key to 
organizational and individual performance; secondly, TK is necessarily related to individuals; 
and thirdly, sharing TK is fundamental for cooperative action in and across organizations. We 
discuss each of the themes below. 
Tacit Knowledge and Performance. Evidence across the perspectives suggests that the vast 
majority of researchers accept the importance of TK for enabling individual and organizational 
performance (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2001; Ebbers & Wijnberg, 2009; Sternberg, 1997; 
Tsoukas, 1996). In the Conversion perspective, this is evident in studies conducted across 
different contexts, ranging from sporting (Berman et al., 2002) to new product development 
(Bierly, Damanpour, & Santoro, 2009; Helfat, 1994, 1997) and management (Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2005; Armstrong & Mahmud, 2008; Feller et al., 2013). Similar results are evident 
in empirical studies in the Interactional perspective (e.g. violin making and mining, see Cattani 
et al., 2013; Kamoche & Maguire, 2011) and Practice perspective (e.g. complying to safety in 
the construction industry, treating patients, practicing corporate law and customer service, see 
Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000; Oborn & Dawson, 2010; Sandberg & Pinnington, 2009; Tsoukas 




Moreover, scholars accept that the tacitness of knowledge has additional benefits to enabling 
performance. Conversionist and Interactionalist scholars maintain that tacitness confers 
individuals and firms hard-to-imitate advantages, across a variety of contexts, ranging from the 
technology sector to management learning (Blackman & Sadler-Smith, 2009; Coff et al., 2006; 
Kamoche et al., 2014; Schilling & Steensma, 2002). This is because TK is “sticky” (Brown & 
Duguid, 2001, p. 199; Griffith et al. 2003, p. 271), that is TK is inherently difficult to imitate 
and transfer beyond its originating context due to its embeddedness in particular bodies and 
settings (Galunic & Rodan, 1998, p. 1196; Salomon &  Martin, 2008, p. 1267). Moreover, all 
perspectives not only recognize that TK is key to performance but, implicitly or explicitly, 
accept that tacitness enables spontaneous performance. This is important because it enables 
agents to respond to situations with minimal time and effort (Collins, 2006; Ebbers & 
Wijnberg, 2009; Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Shotter, 2005; Tsoukas, 2011). 
Tacit Knowledge and Individuals. Studies across the three perspectives highlight that TK is 
necessarily related to individuals. A number of Conversionist researchers maintain that TK is 
“obtained or held by individuals” (Lindley & Wheeler, 2000, p. 361), which, when aggregated, 
makes up the stock of TK in organizations (Feller et al., 2013; Griffith, Sawyer, & Neale, 2003; 
Hedlund, 1994; Kale & Singh, 2007; Kalnins & Mayer, 2004; Moreno-Luzón & Begoña Lloria, 
2008; H. Singh et al., 2016). Similarly, Interactional researchers, despite their particular 
emphasis on collective-level TK, accept that TK, being embedded in bodily and cognitive 
schemata, also resides at the individual level (Collins, 2010; Cook & Brown, 1999; Dörfler & 
Ackermann, 2012; Ribeiro & Collins, 2007; Tywoniak, 2007). Likewise, although Practice 
scholars maintain that knowledge is inherently social, they emphatically underscore the 
personal nature of knowing (D’Eredita & Barreto, 2006; Pyrko et al., 2017; Tsoukas, 2009a), 
since it is an agent’s tacit integration of focal and subsidiary awareness that makes knowledge 




Sharing Tacit Knowledge. Scholars across the three perspectives agree that sharing TK is 
necessary for cooperation in and across organizations. This is so insofar as sharing TK allows 
organizational members to have a common point of reference, which facilitates communication 
and coordination (Enberg et al., 2006; Hong, 2012; Leonardi & Bailey, 2008; Pyrko et al., 
2017; Subramaniam, Rosenthal, & Hatten, 1998). It is accepted that first-hand experience of 
carrying out an activity is a major way of learning TK (Collins, 2006; Gherardi & Nicolini, 
2000; Kim & Kogut, 1996; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Raelin, 1997; Swart, 2011). However, 
scholars from the Conversion and Interactional perspectives view TK as a type of non-
systematized and not easily shareable knowledge. As a result, the tacit nature of TK is seen to 
pose challenges when diverse agents seek to cooperate (Akbar & Tzokas, 2013; Gerwin & 
Ferris, 2004; Gray et al., 2015; Inkpen & Pien, 2006; Lei et al., 1996).  
Despite the challenges posed by tacitness, studies from all three perspectives highlight that TK 
can, indeed, be shared. Scholars from all perspectives agree that social interaction is the key 
mechanism for the transfer and acquisition of TK. As part of social interaction, trust is 
underlined as a key condition to enable people to share their TK (Becerra et al., 2008; Ivory et 
al., 2007; Janowicz-Panjaitan & Noorderhaven, 2009; J. J. Li et al., 2010; Pyrko et al., 2017; 
Tsoukas, 2011). As well as trust, studies from both the Conversion and Interactional 
perspectives, recognize that motivation to share TK is an important issue (Chuang et al., 2016; 
Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Ivory et al., 2007; Osterloh & Frey, 2000). 
Differences across the Three Perspectives on Tacit Knowledge 
Despite their commonalities, there are also considerable differences between the three 
perspectives, which can be traced to their different onto-epistemological assumptions. 
Specifically, scholars working from each perspective take a different stance on the following 




explicit knowledge); secondly, the explication controversy (i.e. whether TK can be explicated); 
and thirdly, the outcome/process controversy (i.e. whether TK should be best analyzed as a fait 
accompli or as an ongoing activity). (see Table 3). We expand on each controversy below. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 Here 
-------------------------- 
 
The Separability Controversy. Conversion scholars assume there is separability between tacit 
and explicit knowledge (Clarysse et al., 2011; Kale & Singh, 2007; Nonaka & von Krogh, 
2009). The assumption of the separability of knowledge types influences Conversionist 
interpretations of how TK is related to performance, individuals, and knowledge sharing. 
Performance-wise, it is assumed that tacit or  explicit knowledge alone is sufficient to carry out 
a task. For example, having been trained with the master baker, Tanaka internalized the 
requisite TK that enabled her to knead dough. By contrast, the twisting-stretch metaphor (i.e. 
a piece of explicit knowledge) was argued to adequately represent the baker’s TK to perform 
dough kneading (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). In turn, explicit knowledge, even of metaphorical 
nature, was sufficient for engineers to design the bread making machine (cf. Ribeiro & Collins, 
2007). Individuals are seen to possess TK, which is stored in their cognitive schemas, but they 
cannot easily convert it to explicit knowledge (Enberg et al., 2006; Sternberg, 1997). The 
aggregation of tacit knowledge held by individuals is argued to form the capabilities of 
organizations (i.e. the ability to accomplish organizational objectives). The tacit or explicit 
nature of knowledge is seen as both a blessing and a curse. Tacit knowledge is a blessing 
because it is hard to imitate by competitors (Coff et al., 2006). It is a curse since it makes it 
hard for employees to share their knowledge amongst themselves, especially if they are 
embedded in different settings (national, divisional, departmental, etc.), or if they possess 
different bodies of expertise, and need to collaborate (Inkpen & Pien, 2006). The reverse is true 




settings; and it is a curse since competitors can easily imitate it. Therefore, sharing knowledge 
is seen as a conversion-cum-protection challenge: how TK may be converted into an explicit 
form and, also, protected from competitors (Dutta & Weiss, 1997; Dyck et al., 2005; Schwens 
et al., 2011). 
Interactional scholars accept the separability between tacit and explicit knowledge, albeit with 
qualifications. They assume that the different knowledge types have different roles and are 
shared differently (Cook & Brown, 1999). Individual TK allows people to know how to 
perform tasks (e.g. haptic sensation of dough-kneading, knowing how to apply engineering 
techniques to mimic the notion of dough-kneading). Collective TK is related to the taken-for-
granted norms of a community (e.g. using established engineering techniques; the implicit 
norms of the engineering community). Individual explicit knowledge is related to knowing-
that (e.g. verbalizing one’s understanding of dough kneading through the twisting-stretch 
metaphor), whereas collective explicit knowledge is related to explicit rules communities may 
have (e.g. shared engineering terminology). Individual TK is seen to be acquired by the 
individual through developing cognitive and bodily schemas. Collective TK is seen to be 
acquired through socialization (Ribeiro & Collins, 2007). TK, at both the collective and 
individual levels, is seen to be related to organizational capabilities (Cook & Brown, 1999). To 
a large degree, studies view TK as a resource that must be protected and efficiently harnessed. 
As a result, sharing TK is studied both from the perspective of the individuals who must build 
up their cognitive and bodily schemas, and from the perspective of the mechanisms that enable 
the proliferation of collective knowledge (Hong, 2012; Williams, 2001).  
Practice scholars deny the separability of knowledge when an agent is engaged in action. They 
do not see TK as separate from explicit knowledge, nor as located at different levels of analysis 
(Shotter, 2005). The focus, rather, is on the continuity of human experience. However, this is 




to the world (Gourlay, 2006a, pp. 1427–28). Thus, in the midst of action, knowledge shows up 
as know-how, while, when reflecting retrospectively on action, knowledge shows up as know-
that (Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009). Moreover, Practice scholars insist that, even in reflection, 
explicit knowledge (know-that) is necessarily grounded on tacit knowledge (know-how), albeit 
a different kind of TK compared to action-related know-how (Tsoukas, 2011).  
Practice scholars argue that to be knowledgeable in anything, one must first be socialized into 
a way of life (i.e. practice), in which people learn to attend from certain subsidiary particulars 
to become focally aware of an object of perception (Miller, 2008; Tsoukas, 2009a). Thus, for 
any performance to be possible (ranging from a predominantly physical one such as bicycle 
riding to a mainly cognitive one, such as strategic planning), TK is seen as a prerequisite. This 
is because action essentially depends on the agent dwelling in subsidiary particulars that enable 
focal awareness. Since noticing subsidiary particulars depends on socialization, the individual 
is seen as always dwelling in social knowledge (Gueldenberg & Helting, 2007).  
With regard to knowledge sharing, practice scholars focus on understanding how knowledge 
is experienced by the agent during the process of refining perception (D’Eredita & Barreto, 
2006; Pyrko et al., 2017). Returning to the design of the bread-making machine, in order for 
the engineers to understand the twisting stretch metaphor, the engineers had to dwell in the 
haptic experience of kneading dough (see Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p.104). Prior to dwelling 
in dough-kneading, they could not understand the metaphor (Tsoukas, 2011). 
The explication controversy. Each perspective takes a different view on the explication of tacit 
knowledge. In particular, Conversion scholars maintain that tacit and explicit knowledge are, 
in principle, mutually convertible to each other. For many, conversion is argued to occur via 
the SECI process (Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009). Feller and colleagues (2013, p. 316), go so far 




abstracted from practice” – it is always waiting to be explicated through conversion. Studies 
illustrate how TK is convertible and thus explicable, insofar as it is put into words, numbers or 
any other explicit form (Akbar & Tzokas, 2013; Ambrosini & Bowman, 2001; Dyck et al., 
2005; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). The use of quantitative methodologies further reinforces 
and seeks to operationalize explication (see Birkinshaw et al., 2002; Robins & Wiersema, 
1995). Once TK has been converted to explicit, the latter may, in turn, be re-converted to tacit 
and re-internalized to enable individual performance (Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009). 
Accordingly, sharing knowledge is studied from the perspective of how individuals and, by 
extension, organizations, can convert and transfer their tacit knowledge (Dyck et al., 2005). 
Interactional scholars accept explication only conditionally and do not consider explication as 
necessary for sharing TK. Interactionalists maintain that explication depends on the further 
development of technology and/or the willingness of individuals to share knowledge they keep 
under their control. Whenever conversion is possible, it should be pursued, but this is not what 
is most important. What is critical, they argue, is the realization that different knowledge types 
are not mutually substitutable: converting tacit to explicit knowledge does not obviate the 
important and independent role of TK in human action (Cook & Brown, 1999; Lam, 2000; 
Tywoniak, 2007). Different knowledge types need to be joined together in order to perform a 
task. Knowledge sharing is accomplished through agents drawing on collective TK to bridge 
the differences in their individual knowledge via dialogue (see Hong, 2012; Rouleau, 2005). 
Beyond human action, however, Interactionalists accept that the conversion of bodily 
individual TK to computer-used data can be directly used by AI, as, for example, is the case 
with robots learning to walk or drive (Aplaydin, 2016; Collins, 2006).  
Practice scholars hold a different view on the explication of TK. Denying that TK is 
convertible, they argue that tacit knowing is a process in which different perceptual elements 




discussed above, Practice researchers highlight the from-to structure of perception (Oborn & 
Dawson, 2010; Pyrko et al., 2017): to be focally aware of an object, one must tacitly integrate 
various subsidiary particulars. Hence, when one is focally perceiving an object, they are 
necessarily not paying attention to the subsidiary particulars that make focal awareness 
possible. One can articulate aspects of their TK by reflecting on subsidiary particulars, but that 
is different from conversion (Shotter & Katz, 1996, p. 230). This is so because to articulate 
something always presupposes tacitly attending from subsidiary particulars (Miller, 2008; 
Tsoukas, 2009a). Thus, for example, as Tsoukas (2005, p. 157) notes, Tanaka’s transfer of 
bread-kneading know-how into Matsushita did not rely on the conversion of her TK, but on re-
punctuating the distinctions implicated in the activity of bread-kneading. What happened, 
Tsoukas (ibid, p.157) argues, is that “through her subsequent conversations with the 
[Matsushita] engineers, Tanaka was able to form an explicit understanding of the activity she 
was involved in, by having her attention drawn to how the master baker was drawing her 
attention to kneading – hence to concept of ‘twisting stretch’”.  
In other words, practitioners, aided by dialogical types of interaction that draw their attention 
to aspects of their experience (Tsoukas, 2009a), re-punctuate their know-how (tacit 
understandings), thus “seeing connections” (Wittgenstein, 1986, §122) among aspects of their 
experience their ordinary forms of language made them overlook (Wittgenstein, 1986, §132). 
Articulating TK via re-punctuation does not mean that TK is fully rendered explicit. It rather 
means that certain aspects of TK, in particular contexts, have been illuminated, thus entering 
human discourse. Articulating aspects of TK does not make all the subsidiaries of human action 
visible, but it does enable an imaginative reconsideration of the premises of human action – it 
suggests a particular possibility. Of course, other possibilities - other articulations - may be 




insofar as people draw each other’s attention to certain subsidiary particulars that were 
previously unnoticed (D’Eredita & Barreto, 2006; Oborn & Dawson, 2010; Tsoukas, 2009a). 
The outcome/process orientation controversy. Lastly, to a large extent, Conversionist and 
Interactionalist scholars tend to consider TK as a fait accompli (an outcome of an already 
completed activity), whereas Practice scholars consider TK as an ongoing activity. As a result, 
different methodological approaches, with different analytical foci, are utilized for researching 
TK.  
Specifically, Conversion and Interactional studies tend to conceptualize TK as an outcome that 
is systematically related to other outcomes (e.g. performance). Both perspectives favor 
explanations that are removed from the everyday experience of agents. As a result, individuals, 
performance, knowledge sharing, and TK itself, are approached as quasi-causally related 
entities (Griffith & Sawyer, 2010). Examples of outcome-oriented studies include the 
association of the dimensions of knowledge with organizational structure (Birkinshaw et al., 
2002), and technological innovativeness with partnership agreements (Dutta & Weiss, 1997).  
Practice studies tend to conceptualize TK as a process. Specifically, TK is understood as 
indwelling: the ongoing process of integration between subsidiary and focal awareness 
(Tsoukas, 2011). Practice scholars maintain that indwelling is an ongoing process that is 
constantly refined by agents engaging in normatively-bound activities. TK and the 
sociomaterial context are understood as inextricably intertwined (Gueldenberg & Helting, 
2007). Therefore, Practice scholars attempt to describe how it is to be ‘inside the moment’ of 
experiencing TK (Shotter, 2005).  
Unlike Conversionists and Interactionalists, Practice scholars do not conceptualize TK as a 
completed process (a resource to be acquired), nor do they seek to identify the effect of one 




TK in order to cope with the dynamic context they inhabit (Sandberg & Pinnington, 2009). To 
learn to perform in an ever-evolving context, individuals are understood to be gradually eased 
into practices – to normatively defined ways of performing activities (Gherardi & Nicolini, 
2000; Sandberg & Pinnington, 2009). Thus, knowledge sharing is understood as an ongoing 
reflexive process in which agents learn to make new distinctions by dialogically engaging with 
others (Tsoukas, 2009a). The strong emphasis on process leads empirical studies to mainly 
adopt qualitative methodologies to illustrate their insights. Most empirical studies are 
ethnographies of workplaces. A variety of contexts have been studied, ranging from call centers 
to hospitals (Oborn & Dawson, 2010; Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001). 
Methodological Implications 
Each perspective orients research towards those elements of TK it identifies as important – that 
is why onto-epistemological assumptions matter. Our framework alerts scholars that posing the 
question ‘which perspective is the right one?’ is misleading. Rather, our review suggests that a 
more fruitful question is: ‘what is it that you want to understand?’ Each perspective sheds light 
on aspects of TK other perspectives do not (and cannot).  
Specifically, Conversion and Interactional studies, by building on an intellectualist onto-
epistemological platform, can explain how relevant constructs are related, by examining TK 
across different settings and larger samples. However, their insights tend to be a-processual 
and often, in the case of Conversion studies, a-contextual. Inasmuch as process and context are 
taken into account, it is usually done by highlighting the abstract principles the study seeks to 
illustrate, not the singularities of agents’ experience (Tsoukas, 2017). Consequently, 
Conversion and Interactional studies focus on TK not as an ongoing activity but as an outcome 
- an already completed process (Langley & Tsoukas, 2017). Indeed, the main value of 




& Knudsen, 2009), that is, they show TK to be systematically related to other constructs usually 
on a macro-scale. However, outcome-focused studies tend to offer their insights without 
exploring the intervening mechanisms in depth (Elster, 2015; Tsoukas & Knudsen, 2005). 
Practice studies may complement the findings of outcome-focused Conversion and 
Interactional studies by zooming into the micro-processes that underpin TK from the viewpoint 
of the engaged agent (see Pyrko et al., 2017; Tsoukas, 2009a). By building on a 
phenomenological onto-epistemological platform, TK is not researched as a fait accompli, but 
as an ongoing accomplishment (Gehman et al., 2013; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). The main value 
of the Practice perspective, is elucidatory (see Tsoukas, 2017) – it seeks to offer process-
sensitive and contextualized accounts of how agents use and experience TK (Tsoukas, 2019). 
However, due to the contextual specificity of Practice studies the generalizability of their 
findings may be limited across contexts. Since the dominance of the Conversion and 
Interactional perspectives has resulted in knowing more about the properties of TK in 
abstracto, we know less about how TK is enacted in concreto (Sandberg, Rouleau, Langley, & 
Tsoukas, 2017). In that sense, there is considerable scope for more research from within the 
Practice perspective.  
In the rest of this subsection we discuss the differences between explaining outcomes and 
elucidating processes (Tsoukas & Knudsen, 2005), as well as new methodological approaches.   
Identifying Outcomes from the Outside: Researching outcomes is especially suitable for 
scholars seeking to theorize TK via the identification of patterns of association of variables 
across large samples. Since Conversionists and Interactionalists tend to adopt an intellectualist 
onto-epistemology, they abstract the unique features that characterize a phenomenon, in order 
to subsume them under generic categories that have already been defined in the literature 




across contexts (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). As a result, claims from studies utilizing these 
methods are especially useful for understanding how TK is related to outcomes ranging from 
individual and organizational performance to knowledge transfer. However, although valuable, 
outcome-centered studies are unable to capture how TK related processes lead to the observed 
outcomes (see Tsoukas, 2017).  
Capturing the Process from Within: Process-oriented research is especially suitable for 
scholars seeking to theorize TK as an ongoing accomplishment: how sociomaterially grounded 
agents carry out their organizational tasks in context (Langley & Tsoukas, 2017). Traditionally, 
qualitative methods are used to capture the tacit knowing from within. Methodologies include 
the use of case studies and ethnographies, drawing their data from interviews, field 
observations and archives. This approach offers rich contextualized accounts of how TK-
related phenomena unfold by being sensitive to the uniqueness of particular cases (see 
Martenson & Lee, 2004; Oborn & Dawson, 2010; Sandberg & Pinnington, 2009).  
The Practice perspective is particularly well equipped to address process questions (Langley & 
Tsoukas, 2017), since it focuses on how agents draw upon TK to carry out their organizational 
tasks. The emphasis is on how the TK-related phenomenon unfolds in relation to each case’s 
specificity and uniqueness. Instead of searching for associations between already-
accomplished outcomes, practice-oriented research seeks to capture how “outcomes” are 
produced and sustained (Tsoukas, 2017). The emphasis on contextual uniqueness enables 
practice-based studies to research a phenomenon in depth by seeking to overcome unnecessary 
dualisms (Tsoukas, 2017). Thus, practice studies illustrate how individual TK is inseparable to 
collective TK (Pyrko et al., 2017), how TK, although non-abstractable, is partially articulable 
(Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000), and how TK is essentially (non-contingently) shaped by context 




New Methodological Approaches. Researchers are encouraged to use a wider range of methods 
than hitherto used to study TK. Irrespective of their onto-epistemological commitments, 
scholars could utilize mixed methods to address a wide range of questions. Although seven 
studies that adopt an intellectualist onto-epistemology have used mixed methods, this does not 
mean that studies adopting a phenomenological onto-epistemology cannot also use mixed-
methods to answer process-oriented questions (Almeida et al., 2002; Attewell, 1992; Dyck et 
al., 2005; Kidd, 1998; Lecuona & Reitzig, 2014; Munoz, Mosey, & Binks, 2011; Wang & 
Ramiller, 2009). Although phenomenological studies predominantly use case studies and 
ethnographies to study TK processes, value can be found in less popular methods such as 
conversation and discourse analyses, which have rarely been used (cf. Rouleau, 2005; Wang 
& Ramiller, 2009). The benefit of such methods is that they enable a closer, in-depth focus on 
micro-practices and micro-processes (see Alvesson & Karreman, 2000). Discursive 
approaches, in particular, can be used in the other direction as well: to illuminate some of the 
macro-issues that impinge on TK use. For example, institutionalized understandings of 
important issues (e.g. corporate responsibility, disruptive innovation, professional competence) 
and taken-for-granted ways of thinking and acting at the level of institutional fields can be 
fruitfully analyzed via discourse analyses (Chia, 2000, pp. 514–515; see Phillips, N., Lawrence, 
T. B., & Hardy, 2004) to show how the knowledge categories used in organizational practices 
are constructed (Gehman et al., 2013). Moreover, methods such as computer simulations have 
also been rarely used and could be employed to offer new ways of examining questions about 
TK (Miller et al., 2006). 
Directions for Future Research.  
Our review of research on TK has enabled us to shed light on the under-researched topics and 
under-utilized perspectives that lend themselves for further research. Below, we suggest new 




Context and the Operationalization of TK. In light of our review, to explicate TK through 
quantitative methodologies does not preclude the study of TK in context. Contextual features, 
especially in quantitative studies, are usually relegated to a peripheral status. As findings from 
studies that have taken into account contextual features are limited, further research is required  
(cf. Lecuona & Reitzig, 2014; Shamsie & Mannor, 2013). In line with these observations, and 
in conjunction with calls for better operationalization (direct and indirect) of TK (Ambrosini 
& Bowman, 2001; Levitas & Chi, 2002; Munoz et al., 2011), the latter can be improved if 
scholars specify which ability/skill and organizational process TK is related to.  
Methodologically, a notable exception to the downplaying of context, at least on the individual 
level, are situational judgement tests because to a certain extent they can take into consideration 
situational circumstances (see Krumm et al., 2015). 
Interrelatedness of Knowledge Types. Although the Interactional perspective assumes that 
different knowledge types (e.g. somatic TK, collective TK) are joined together to contribute to 
skillful action, beyond conceptual studies, there is little empirical work examining this 
dimension (Collins, 2006, 2010; Cook & Brown, 1999; cf. Gerpott et al., 2017). Therefore, 
empirical studies could examine how and what the effects of joining knowledge types together 
are on both the individual and collective levels. Questions that empirical studies could focus 
on include: What conditions facilitate the sharing of particular types of TK (somatic, collective, 
relational)? Are different social contexts more effective in sharing particular types of TK?  
Indwelling, Embodiment, and Sociomateriality. Indwelling, although widely accepted and 
referenced, has not been used extensively and consistently by management scholars (cf. Miller, 
2008; Oborn & Dawson, 2010; Pyrko et al., 2017; Tsoukas, 2011; Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 
2001). The study of indwelling treats TK not merely as articulable or as an ineffable resource, 
but as an embodied and embedded capacity that is ever refinable over time via discursive 




recognized as important in the Interactional and Practice perspectives. However, despite their 
acknowledgment, in most studies, embodiment and sociomateriality have not been the core 
focus (cf Kamoche & Maguire, 2011; Sandberg & Pinnington, 2009; Maitlis & Christianson, 
2014, p. 100; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008, p. 466). Future studies could elaborate on how 
embodied TK is acquired and developed in organizational settings, and how this is mediated 
by the context’s sociomaterial infrastructure. 
Knowledge Sharing. As discussed above, a wide variety of methods for helping people acquire 
TK have been studied (e.g. web-based instruction, practical experience, simulations games). 
However, further research could further evaluate whether the effectiveness of imparting TK by 
using web-based, classroom instruction and computer based simulations depend on the type of 
skill they seek to teach. Another question, which has not been considered so far, is whether the 
combination of the methods and the timing of use of each could increase the acquisition of TK 
(e.g. Szulanski et al., 2016). Moreover, with an increasingly aging workforce in rich countries, 
further attention needs to be paid to how teaching methods fit trainee learning styles and age 
groups (Armstrong & Li, 2017, p. 19; Gerpott et al., 2017; Ng & Feldman, 2008).  
Furthermore, process-sensitive research could complement the above outcome-focused 
research by developing a better understanding of the practices of learning and teaching (see 
Raelin, 2007). Research in this direction is scarce despite some scholars arguing that TK is 
shared by people drawing each other’s attention to aspects of situations that were previously 
unnoticed (see D’Eredita & Barreto, 2006; Oborn & Dawson, 2010; Pyrko et al., 2017; 
Tsoukas, 2009a). The continuation of these efforts is strongly encouraged because pursuing a 
process-sensitive approach could assist to further clarify the processes with which each 
teaching method and learning style enables trainees to acquire TK and, as a result, identify and 




Emotions and Tacit Knowledge. As previously outlined, the relevance of emotions to sharing 
TK has received a great deal of attention from scholars adopting the Conversion and 
Interactional perspectives. Beyond implications for knowledge transfer, research on the 
relatedness of emotions and TK is limited (cf. Shotter & Tsoukas, 2014). The Practice 
perspective is especially suitable for further investigating this topic, especially since practice 
studies show that individuals care about what they do (see Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000; 
Sandberg & Pinnington, 2009). Although the emotional background of TK has been pointed 
out (expertise develops to the extent people care for what they do), research remains scarce 
about how relevant emotions develop, with what effects. 
TK and Artificial Intelligence (AI). All three perspectives have researched TK in relation to a 
broad domain of constructs, contexts and practices. However, none of the reviewed studies has 
focused on exploring the development of AI in relation to TK in the workplace. AI applications 
can now reliably offer medical diagnoses, win against humans in certain board games, and are 
even learning to drive (Aplaydin, 2016; Silver et al., 2016; von Krogh, 2018). What do such 
developments imply for TK in organizations? The distinctions drawn in this review allow us 
to address this question.   
Employing an intellectualist onto-epistemological prism (Dreyfus, 1988) (as manifested in the 
Conversion and Interactional perspectives), computer scientists can partly capture knowledge 
that is taken for granted by experts in certain domains (in the form of sound, text, images and 
numbers), which can then be fed into AI algorithms (von Krogh, 2018, p. 405). By continuously 
inputting the latter, an AI system learns from repetition and/or feedback from their environment 
to perform certain tasks. Tasks include performing analyses to identify patterns or achieve a 
structured pre-specified goal (e.g. a medical diagnosis). This has enabled AI to do rather well 
in highly structured domains (in which clear rules are in place), such as board games and 




context and, thus, does not respond effectively (yet, at least) to contextual changes and nuances. 
In general, “machine performance may degrade dramatically if the original task is modified 
even slightly” (Shoham, Perrault, Brynjolfsson, Clark, & LeGassick, 2017, p. 37).  
The Practice perspective allows us to understand that contextual sensitivity, which is major 
feature of TK, is still highly relevant to action in organizations (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005). 
Even when AI empirically assists in the carrying out of tasks, a contextually sensitive 
practitioner (who dwells in TK) is still necessary to judge whether AI is relevant to a problem 
(von Krogh, 2018, p. 406) and, if so, make sense of the computations (especially in open-ended 
tasks) and undertake reflective action (Ribeiro, 2017). For example, AI may be able to diagnose 
skin cancer, but the diagnosis does not mean anything to the AI system. A medical practitioner 
is required to make sense of the diagnosis and sympathetically suggest a treatment to the 
patient. To do this, the practitioner must dwell in the shared normative distinctions that are 
prevalent in their practice.  
The everyday world of human agents is not experienced as a set of contingently interrelated 
facts (Dreyfus, 2017). Rather, it is experienced as a meaningful ensemble (a relational whole) 
wherein perceiving the usefulness of various objects (i.e. what they are for) presupposes 
indwelling – immersion in practices and skills. A skin cancer diagnosis, for example, may 
suggest physical and psychological suffering and the possibility of death. Such consequences 
have an experiential quality and valence that cannot be captured by merely stating facts (see 
Nagel, 1974). Medical practitioners are called to pick up and suggest a course of treatment to 
the patient, as well as sustain the patient’s cooperation throughout by sympathetically attending 
to those human-related issues that are beyond the grasp of algorithms (e.g. psychological state 




In short, the possibility of holding and analyzing vast amounts of data does not render TK 
irrelevant to organizations, far from it. To be skilled entails to have acquired contextual 
sensitivity; it is not simply a matter of knowing facts, but knowing which facts are relevant to 
what situation, and act on that knowledge competently (Dreyfus, 2007, p. 248). This is not 
done on the basis of strict rule following but on the basis of judgement (Ribeiro, 2017; Shotter 
& Tsoukas, 2014). As Ryle (1949) has insightfully argued, to be knowledgeable is not 
equivalent to be a rule follower: to be able to apply a rule, one would have to rely on another 
rule for applying the first rule, and so on ad infinitum. 
Rather than making TK irrelevant, the introduction of AI to the workplace highlights the need 
for developing new skills that reap the benefits of AI, while maintaining individuals’ critical 
capacity for situational discretion and human meaning in the deployment of AI and the use of 
AI-generated outputs. Advances in AI are speeding processes up, transforming expertise, work 
boundaries, control and decision making (Barrett, Oborn, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2012; Beane 
& Orlikowski, 2015; Faraj, Pachidi, & Sayegh, 2018; von Krogh, 2018). Despite these 
developments, we know little about how advances in AI are changing the development and use 
of TK in the workplace (e.g. creating new skills while making others redundant). Outcome-
focused approaches, as manifested by the Conversion and Interactional studies, could 
illuminate the effects of AI on TK-related phenomena (e.g. knowledge sharing and knowledge 
creation). Practice studies could illuminate the micro-processes with which AI is transforming 
TK the workplace. For example, how is AI-related TK acquired? What difference does the 
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TABLE 1 
Assumptions of Perspectives on Tacit Knowledge (TK) 
 Conversion Interactional Practice 
Image of 
Knowledge 
Outcome Outcome Process 
Relationship 
between tacit and 
explicit knowledge 




Tacit and explicit 
knowledge must be joined 
together 
All knowledge is grounded in 
tacit knowledge 
   
Locus of Study Primarily Individual Individual-cum-Collective Agent embedded in practice 
 
TABLE 2 






Tacit Knowledge A type of knowledge that is subjective, largely inaccessible to consciousness, 
tied to activity and awaiting conversion into an explicit form. 
 
Explicit Knowledge A type of knowledge that is objective, accessible to consciousness and in 




A type of knowledge that is difficult to articulate and is the result of the 







Conversion of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge and vice-versa. It is 




Foundational Outlines key assumptions of the perspective 
e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995). Through the discussion of  different 
empirical cases, the authors illustrate the importance of tacit knowledge and 
the process of how it is converted to explicit knowledge and vice-versa. 
 
Performance Outlines the links between tacit knowledge and performance 
e.g. Shamsie and Manor (2013). Through an analysis of data from Major 
League Baseball teams, the authors provide evidence of the importance of 




Outlines ways of managing tacit knowledge in and across organizations 
e.g. Lam (1997). The author suggests that the explication of tacit knowledge, 
is essential to make it “easily understood and accessed by those who do not 





Strategy Outlines the links between tacit knowledge and strategic decisions (e.g. 
planning, mergers, acquisitions and organizational structure). 
e.g. Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2015). The authors highlight that 
organizations should pay attention to the vulnerability of their resources (e.g. 
tacit knowledge and its ambiguity). To counter this issue, the authors suggest 







Tacit Knowledge A type of knowledge largely inaccessible to consciousness, tied to activity 
that can only be conditionally converted. 
Explicit Knowledge A type of knowledge that is objective, accessible to consciousness and in 
close correspondence with theory. 
 
Individual Tacit Knowledge Tacit knowledge which is part of the cognitive and bodily schemata of 
individuals. 
 
Collective Tacit Knowledge Tacit knowledge embedded in norms of appropriateness; it is manifested in 
stories. 
 
Individual Explicit Knowledge Information/facts known by individuals. 
 





Interaction Actions require the individual to join together tacit/explicit and collective/ 





Foundational Outlines key assumptions of the perspective. 
e.g. Cook and Brown (1999). The authors argue that organizations can be 
better understood when explicit, tacit, individual and group knowledge are 
treated as four separate, but equal types of knowledge, which are enjoined 
through knowing during action.  
 
Knowledge Sharing Outlines ways of sharing tacit knowledge in and across organizations. 
e.g. Ribeiro and Collins (2007). The authors revisit the classic case of bread-
making machine. Instead of conversion, they maintain that different types of 






Tacit Knowledge Knowledge that is hard to express and be conscious of, which stems from the 
constant process of indwelling. 
 
Explicit Knowledge Partially articulable knowledge which is embedded in tacit knowledge.  
 




Indwelling The spontaneous integration of focal and subsidiary awareness in the act of 
knowing. 
  








Outlines key assumptions of the perspective. 
e.g. Brown & Duguid (2001). Through the lens of communities of practice it 
is suggested that epistemic differences are the result of different practices, 
rather than different types of knowledge (e.g. tacit/explicit). 
 
Skill Outlines how practitioners experience tacit knowledge in organizations. 
e.g. Tsoukas & Vladimirou (2001). By drawing on a case study of a 
telecommunication organization, the authors argue that organizational 
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outcomes or process.) 
Outcome Outcome Process 
 
